Kering SA – Lobbying Governance & Transparency

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Lobbying Governance

Overall Assessment	Analysis	Score
Strong	Kering discloses a well-defined governance structure that actively steers both its own advocacy and its participation in trade bodies so that they align with the Group’s climate goals. It states that “one of the missions of the Sustainability Committee at Board level is to ensure that all direct and indirect activities that influence policy are consistent with Kering's overall climate change strategy,” and that this committee “comprises six Directors” and has been “particularly active in the definition of the Group 2025 sustainability strategy and the implementation of its science-based target for GHG emissions,” demonstrating clear board-level oversight. Operational responsibility sits with the Chief Sustainability and International Affairs Officer who “is also Head of international institutional affairs… therefore keeping direct and indirect policy influence activities in line with Group’s sustainability strategy,” establishing an identified executive owner. Detailed monitoring mechanisms are described: new association memberships “are referred to the Group Compliance Department,” Kering “constantly monitors news relating to these organizations,” and representatives “can make a referral to the Compliance Department where they have doubts.” If “a material misalignment between the positions of an association… and its own ESG objectives” is found, the Group will “engage with the association concerned to achieve realignment with clear timelines” and, failing that, “questions whether to leave the association,” showing an explicit process for managing indirect lobbying conflicts. Direct lobbying is also controlled; “institutional meetings … are disclosed internally and are subject to prior checks by Kering’s Compliance department in order to avoid any risk of a conflict of interest.” The company also confirms a “public commitment… to conduct… engagement activities in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.” However, Kering “has not published any responsible lobbying charter to date,” and there is no publicly available climate-lobbying alignment report or third-party audit, so transparency on the outcomes of these controls remains limited. Overall, the disclosures indicate strong governance of both direct and indirect climate lobbying, but the absence of a public alignment review or charter leaves room for greater transparency and formalisation. View Sources	B

Overall Assessment

Analysis

Score

Strong

Kering discloses a well-defined governance structure that actively steers both its own advocacy and its participation in trade bodies so that they align with the Group’s climate goals. It states that “one of the missions of the Sustainability Committee at Board level is to ensure that all direct and indirect activities that influence policy are consistent with Kering's overall climate change strategy,” and that this committee “comprises six Directors” and has been “particularly active in the definition of the Group 2025 sustainability strategy and the implementation of its science-based target for GHG emissions,” demonstrating clear board-level oversight. Operational responsibility sits with the Chief Sustainability and International Affairs Officer who “is also Head of international institutional affairs… therefore keeping direct and indirect policy influence activities in line with Group’s sustainability strategy,” establishing an identified executive owner. Detailed monitoring mechanisms are described: new association memberships “are referred to the Group Compliance Department,” Kering “constantly monitors news relating to these organizations,” and representatives “can make a referral to the Compliance Department where they have doubts.” If “a material misalignment between the positions of an association… and its own ESG objectives” is found, the Group will “engage with the association concerned to achieve realignment with clear timelines” and, failing that, “questions whether to leave the association,” showing an explicit process for managing indirect lobbying conflicts. Direct lobbying is also controlled; “institutional meetings … are disclosed internally and are subject to prior checks by Kering’s Compliance department in order to avoid any risk of a conflict of interest.” The company also confirms a “public commitment… to conduct… engagement activities in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.” However, Kering “has not published any responsible lobbying charter to date,” and there is no publicly available climate-lobbying alignment report or third-party audit, so transparency on the outcomes of these controls remains limited. Overall, the disclosures indicate strong governance of both direct and indirect climate lobbying, but the absence of a public alignment review or charter leaves room for greater transparency and formalisation.

View Sources

Lobbying Transparency

Overall Assessment	Analysis	Score
Moderate	Kering provides a moderate level of transparency on its climate-related lobbying. The company explicitly names one identifiable policy initiative—the European Commission’s Single Market for Green Products, including the Product and Organisation Environmental Footprint (PEF/OEF) work—stating that “Kering is member of the Technical Secretariat regarding OEF for the retailing sector and is also contributing to several workstream on PEF.” It does not, however, list additional specific laws or regulations it seeks to influence. Kering does, on the other hand, give relatively clear insight into how and where it lobbies: it leads the Fashion Pact at the request of the French President, contributes to European Commission technical workstreams, and submits feedback to bodies such as EFRAG/ISSB, demonstrating the use of at least three distinct mechanisms (direct coalition leadership, participation in EU technical groups, and formal consultation responses) and identifying the policy targets (the French Presidency, the European Commission, and EFRAG/ISSB). In terms of objectives, the company goes beyond broad sustainability rhetoric only once, indicating that its engagement with the PEF/OEF initiative aims to “contribute to the sector rules for retailers” by embedding its Environmental Profit & Loss methodology, but it does not specify further legislative outcomes it wishes to secure. Overall, while the channels and audiences of its lobbying are described in some detail, the disclosures still lack a fuller list of the policies addressed and the concrete policy changes the group is advocating for.	C