Apple Inc

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Direct Lobbying Transparency

Overall Assessment	Comment	Score
Comprehensive	Apple Inc. provides a highly detailed picture of its climate-policy lobbying. It names a wide array of identifiable measures it engages on, including the U.S. “Clean Power Plan,” the proposed federal “Clean Energy Standard” to decarbonize the power grid by 2035, California’s “Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act (SB 253),” the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s interconnection queue reforms, Japan’s renewable-energy credit trading system and “direct transactions of Non-Fossil Fuel Certificates,” Viet Nam’s “Direct Power Purchase Agreement” pilot, the Republic of Korea’s “Green Premium and PPA rules,” and amendments to the “Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes.” The company also explains exactly how it tries to influence those policies and whom it approaches: it “submitted a comment to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,” filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold EPA authority, held “ad-hoc meetings” with Japanese officials, engaged the “California Energy Commission” on efficiency standards, and lobbies indirectly through bodies such as the Asia Clean Energy Coalition, the Japan Climate Leaders’ Partnership, RE100, and “America Is All In.” Each example names both the mechanism (comments, briefs, letters, advisory working groups) and the governmental or regulatory target. Finally, Apple is explicit about the results it seeks. It has urged the EPA to “retain the existing Clean Power Plan,” backs a renewable-energy credit market in Japan that includes “more detailed project data,” supports “a direct power purchase agreement to enable companies to purchase new renewable electricity” in Viet Nam, calls for FERC reforms “with no exceptions,” and looks to keep strong environmental protections while streamlining the Basel Convention. These stated end goals are concrete, often linked to time-bound emission or renewable-energy targets, and aligned with the company’s 2030 carbon-neutral ambition. Together, these disclosures demonstrate a comprehensive level of transparency around Apple’s climate-related lobbying activities.	4

Lobbying Governance

Overall Assessment	Comment	Score
Strong	Apple discloses a well-defined process for keeping its policy advocacy in line with its climate objectives. The company states that "Apple’s Vice President of Environment, Policy and Social Initiatives, Lisa Jackson, oversees Apple’s worldwide governmental affairs team to ensure alignment of policy influencing activities with our climate change strategy," and that she "reviews all significant legislative, public policy, and communications initiatives related to climate and environment, as well as all substantive participation requests for environmental advocacy," demonstrating day-to-day oversight of direct lobbying. Oversight at the board level is also described, as "Apple's Board of Directors reviews and discusses updates on environmental matters," and in 2022 "the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee’s oversight of Apple’s strategies, policies, and practices relating to environmental and social matters" was formalised, indicating clear governance ownership. For indirect lobbying, Apple explains that "when deciding whether to join or maintain membership in a trade association … that trade association’s position and activity on climate change is a factor Apple considers" and warns that "if direct or indirect engagement activities become inconsistent with our overall climate change strategy, we may disengage," citing its 2009 exit from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as evidence. The company also confirms a public commitment to conduct engagement "in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement." While this indicates strong governance—covering both direct and indirect lobbying with named accountability—Apple does not disclose a dedicated, publicly available climate-lobbying alignment report or third-party audit, and it provides limited detail on the frequency or criteria of its trade-association reviews, so the transparency of its monitoring process remains partial.	3