Hyosung Corp

Lobbying Transparency and Governance

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Direct Lobbying Transparency
Overall Assessment Comment Score
Comprehensive Hyosung Corp provides extensive, specific disclosure of its climate-policy lobbying activities. On the policies themselves, it names multiple concrete measures it engages on, including the Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits that underpins the Korean ETS (noting that “Hyosung has been a subject of Korea ETS since 2015”), the 2021 Hydrogen Act and the government’s hydrogen-economy road-map, and the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. The company is equally explicit about how and where it lobbies: it participates in government-hosted presentations and hearings on the ETS, presents views at events such as the “2022 Offshore Wind Power International Forum”, provides emissions data directly to regulators, works through trade associations like the Korea Chemical Fibers Association and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and signs formal agreements such as the “Liquefied Hydrogen Ecosystem Creation Agreement” alongside several ministries. The intended targets are clearly identified—the National Assembly, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and the Ministry of Science and ICT—demonstrating who receives its advocacy. Finally, Hyosung spells out the concrete outcomes it seeks: it has asked that electricity users be exempted from a double-counted carbon-emissions calculation under the ETS, urges policy support for greenhouse-gas reduction projects that bolster export competitiveness, and backs quantified hydrogen-economy goals such as deploying 30,000 hydrogen trucks, installing 70 liquefied-hydrogen filling stations by 2030, achieving 7.15 % clean-hydrogen power generation by 2036, and nurturing more than 600 hydrogen-specialised companies. This level of detail on the policies addressed, the mechanisms and targets used, and the precise results sought demonstrates a comprehensive degree of transparency in the company’s climate-related lobbying disclosures. 4
Lobbying Governance
Overall Assessment Comment Score
Moderate Hyosung Corp discloses a basic governance structure for managing how its climate-related engagement is handled but provides only limited insight into how it tests the alignment of that engagement. The company states that "Our Board of Directors (BOD) and ESG Management Committee are responsible for deliberating on ESG-related policies" and that "the ESG Management Promotion Committee under the CEO … is held once a quarter to select major issues to be presented or reported to the BOD," which identifies a named committee and a regular review cadence. It adds that "Major details related to Korea ETS are shared … and are reported to the ESG Management Promotion Committee," and that it "is providing information about the industry and suggesting opinions on policy implementation through the Korea Chemical Fibers Association," indicating that both direct contact with government and indirect activity through an industry body are captured in its reporting line. The company further claims it has "a public commitment … to conduct your engagement activities in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement" and that it is "strengthening cooperation … in order to effectively respond to K-ETS," suggesting an intention to align lobbying with its climate strategy. However, Hyosung does not disclose any formal methodology or criteria for assessing whether the positions taken by the Korea Chemical Fibers Association (or other trade bodies) match its own climate objectives, nor does it mention any corrective actions such as engaging, escalating, or exiting an association whose stance conflicts with its goals. No standalone climate-lobbying review or audit is referenced, and there is no description of how the company evaluates its own direct advocacy against Paris-aligned benchmarks. Consequently, while the presence of board-level oversight and a stated alignment commitment indicate some governance, the absence of a detailed monitoring process or evidence of active alignment with trade associations shows that the disclosure remains moderate rather than comprehensive. 2